The AFL's holy grail: the quest for an even competition by Davies, Chris
12JCULR 
Abstract 
Dr Chris Davies 
THE AFL'S HOLY GRAIL: THE 
QUEST FOR AN EVEN 
COMPETITION 
DR CHRIS DAVIES * 
65 
The Australian Football League (AFL) and its forerunner, the Victorian 
Football League (VFL), have implemented a number oflabour market controls 
including metropolitan zoning, country zoning, a transfer system and more 
recently, a salary cap and draft system, The restraint of trade doctrine requires 
that any party implementing labour market controls be able to show that such 
restraints help to achieve the stated objectives of such controls, namely the 
creation of more even competition, This paper therefore examines how the 
evenness of a competition such as the AFL may be measured. The author's 
study involves measuring the number of different teams that have won 
premierships in the various decades of the VFL-AFL, whether all teams have 
made the finals at least once in these decades, and how many teams have 
fulfilled their 'finals quota' in a given decade. It is suggested that the figures 
obtained from this study indicate that the AFL has been successful in creating 
a more even competition during the 1990\, one that is continuing into the 
present decade. 
INTRODUCTION 
Labour market controls have been used in professional team sports for well 
over a hundred years,l with the stated intention of creating a more even, 
and arguably a more financially viable league competition. The argument 
for this is that the attractiveness of the competition depends on the high 
degree of uncertainty about the results with Dabscheck2 and Buti' 
suggesting that this basic premise has been generally accepted in the 
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, The Victorian Football League (VFL) introduced a metropolitan zoning system 
when it Vias fomled in 1897, \V'hile English soccer introduced a maximum wage 
restriction in 1901. 
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literature. Sports administrators have also sought to justifY these labour 
and product market C011U'ols on the basis of the peculiar economics of the 
sports industry.4 This means that rather than clubs seeking to put 
competitors out of business, there is a mutual interdependence to ensure 
that all survive as even the strongest clubs can only survive provided other 
clubs remain viable entities. 5 Thus the paradox of competition in 
professional team sports is that, whilst a club's objective is to finish the 
season in a higher league position than any of its rivals, it also has vested 
interest in the continuing success of its league rivals, for the more 
successful the rival is in tcnns of league position and popularity, the larger 
will be the attendance resulting from the common productG 
While recent publications in sport economics have looked at this question 
of measuring equality in a sports competition, it is suggested that the 
methods advanced in these publications may nm into the evidentiary 
problems highlighted in Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League 
(,Adamson '/, namely that the sample size may be too small to be 
statistically significant, and that the economists who have can-ied out this 
type of work may not be accepted as expelis in statistics by the court. It 
should also be noted that in Adamson, Hill J also questioned the 
application of economic theory to sports competitions.8 
This paper will therefore examine this question of what can be presented 
as expert evidence in relation to the equality of a competition, and then 
present material that looks at the equality of the Australian Football 
League (AFL) competition in a way that may avoid the problems 
highlighted in Adamson. It will also provide a brief overview of the use of 
labour market controls by the AFL, and its forerUlmer, the Victorian 
Football League (VFL).9 It is suggested therefore that the contribution this 
4 Ibid 142. 
5 W.C. Neal, 'The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports' (1964) 78 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1. 
6 P.J. Sloane, 'The Economics of Professional Sports: The Football Club as Utility 
Maximiser' (1971) 18 Scottish Journal of Political Economy 121, 124. 
7 (1991) 27 FCR 535. This case involved a legal challenge by the players Lo the 
draft system implemented by the New South Wales Rugby League (NSWRL). 
8 Ibid 563. 
9 When the VFL formed in 1897 it consisted of eight Victorian teams, with five 
more being admitted over the next 28 years, though one team, University only 
competed from 1908-1914. During the 1980's the competition began to take on 
a more national identity, beginning with South Melbourne's move to Sydney in 
1982. Two more interstate teams then joined the VFL in 1987, West Coast and 
the Brisbane Bears (no..,,,, the Brisbane Lions). To reflect this change in identity 
the name was changed from the Victorian Football League to the Australian 
Football League for the 1990 season. It should also be noted that the reserve 
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paper can make to the literature is to present some figures that would seem 
to indicate that the AFL has created a more even competition, and provide 
a methodology that may be more acceptable to the courts than the 
statistical based method that was used in Adamson. 
LABOUR MARKET CONTROLS AND THE VFLlAFL 
When the VFL was formed in 1897 it introduced a metropolitan zoning 
system. Under this system all players in the Melbourne metropolitan area 
were tied to a specific club, depending on where they lived, and could not 
play for another club unless released by the club to. whom they were 
zoned. In 1968 country zoning was introduced dividing country areas of 
Victoria and parts of NSW into zones which were then allocated to the 
various clubs. A player wishing to play in the VFL therefore had the club 
he would play for determined by the area in which he lived and could only 
change clubs after the original club granted a clearance and received a 
transfer fee in retum. 10 
In 1986, the now national VFL adopted a national draft system as its 
method of distributing player talent equally amongst the clubs due to 
perceived problems with the transfer system and after the zoning systems 
and their associated clearance rules were the subject of successful 
litigation in Foschini v Victorian Football League and South Melbourne 
Football Club {'Foschini ')11. The system was modelled on the National 
Football League (NFL)'s draft and involved the last placed team from the 
previous season's competition year given the first choice of the available 
players for the following season. The second last team then gets the next 
pick, and so on, until every team has had a selection, and the process is 
repeated for second, third round etc draft choices. Such a system can 
involve just the players already playing in the league through what is 
commonly known a& an intemal draft. Altematively, the draft can consist 
of new players to the competition in what is referred to as an extemal draft. 
Both are utilized by the AFL, with players entering the competition for the 
first time doing so by means of an extemalnational draft or aitemative1y, 
the rookie draft.12 Players can be traded from one team to another in the 
grade teams of the Victorian based AFL teams merged with the Victorian 
Football Association (VFA) to fann a new competition called the VFL. 
10 Brahm Dabscheck, 'Sporting Labour Markets and the Courts' (1985) 2 Sporting 
Traditions 2, 2. 
II (Unreported, Supreme Comt of Victoria, Crockett J, 15 April 1983). 
12 This draft is limited to players lmder the age of 23 and takes place after the 
national draft. It operates on the same principle as the national draft in that the 
lowest placed team has the first selection of the available players. Note the 
68 The AFL's Holy Grail 12JCULR 
national draft, or change teams by means of the internal pre-season draft. 
Players entering the competition for the first time by means of the external 
national draft are required to sign a two year contract with the club that 
drafts them. 
The VFL introduced a salary cap system in 1984. This system unlike the 
maximum wage restraint, does not limit the amount that anyone player 
can earn, but instead it restricts the overall amount that a particular club 
can spend on player salaries. For the 2007 AFL season that level will be 
$6.94m. 13 The idea behind a salary cap is that by ensuring that all clubs 
have the same amount of money to spend on players, the best players will 
not all be signed by the richer clubs, and so a more even competition will 
be crcated. 
However, both the salary cap and draft system rules implemented by the 
VFL and AFL have included, at certain times, various concessions for 
some clubs. For instance, when West Coast, Adelaide, Fremantle and Port 
Adelaide entered the competition they were granted a number of pre-draft 
selections. Sydney and Brisbane were granted state based zones that 
enabled them to select players from NSW and Queensland respectively 
before the national draft. From 1986 to 1992, each Victorian club was 
allowed to select one player from its metropolitan zone before the national 
draft.14 The influence of these selections can be seen from the fact that all 
the AFL premiers from 2000-05 still had a number of players who were 
not obtained directly from one of the AFL drafts, or from the trade aspect 
of the national draft. 
Prior to 2006 a system of priority selections was also used whereby teams 
that won less than five games in a season were eligible for a priority 
selection before the fIrst round of the national draft. The AFL has now 
abandoned this system, one reason being that there were suggestions that 
teams could deliberately lose games late in the season in order to qualify 
for a priority selection. However, teams that do not win the prescribed 
number of games will be eligible for an extra selection between the first 
and second rounds. 
Brisbane and Sydm~y were granted an extra 10 percent and 15 percent 
increase in the salary cap respectively to compensate for the fact that they 
rookies are than placed on the rookie list but can be elevated to the senior list to 
replace players who have long term injuries. 
\3 'Strength in new pay deal', AFL Record, 4 August, 2006, 16. The AFL and the 
AFLPlayers Association agreed that this will rise to $7.43m in 2008, $7.70m in 
2009, £7.96m in 2010, and $8.22111 in 201l. 
14 Michael Lovett (ed), AFL Record. Guide to Season 2006 (2006) 335. 
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had more players from other states. This was seen as protection from other 
clubs making good offers to entice players back to their home states. The 
reason why Sydney was granted a further five per cent was to take into 
consideration that the higher cost of housing in Sydney. Brisbane and 
Sydney are no longer granted an extra ten per cent abov," the salary cap, 
though Sydney retains a seven per cent housing allowance. 
Despite these concessions, the aim of the twin system of the salary cap and 
draft system is to help create a more even competition. These concessions 
were granted to help rectify some in-built inequalities that were considered 
to exist at various timcs. This, for instancc, is why Sydney rctains its 
housing allowance. If the aim of a moqe even competition is accepted as a 
legitimate objectivc of a league, 15 thcn the restraint of trade doctrine 
requires a determination of whether the labour market controls used 
actually achieve the stated objective. This raises the question as to how and 
who can present such evidence in a court of law, thus requiring an 
examination of the area of expeli witnesses. Therefore, before looking at 
the use of expert evidence ill Adamson, it is necessary to present a brief 
review of general principles regarding the use of expert witnesses. 
\I EXPERT EVIDENCE IN SPORTS CASES 
A The Principles of Expert Evidence 
An underlying principle of evidence law is that witnesses are only allowed 
to givc evidence relating to what they have expcrienccd with their senses, 
and are not allowed to give evidence that relates to their opinion. One 
exception to this opinion rule is the use of expert witnesses. However, 
while such witnesses have been allowed by the courts to provide evidence 
in a wide variety of areas, 'it has always been a fundamental tenet of 
evidence law that they are not permitted the privilege of giving evidence in 
15 Note that the High Court in Buckley v Tufty (1971) 125 CLR 353,377, while 
declaring rugby league's retain and transfer system to be an unreasonable 
restraint of trade, acknowledged that it was a legitimate objective of the league 
to ensure that the teams in the competition were as strong and as well matched 
as possible. In Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League (1991) 27 FCR 535, 
560, Justice Hill stated that the three legitimate interests of the league were: (1) 
the desirability of a strong and competiLive competition with the teams as 
equally matched as possible, (2) all the clubs competing to be as fInancially 
viable as possible, and (3) that rich clubs would not be able to plunder the 
weaker clubs of their players. This raises the issue of protectable interests, a 
concept at the heart of the justification of a restraint of trade, as a covenantee is 
entitled to protect celiain interests: see J. Carter and D Harland, Contract Law in 
Australia (2002) 588. 
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the fom1 of opinions if they are not properly designated experts.' 16 In 
Clark v Ryan 17, for instance, a case that involved a highway collision 
between an articulated semi-trailer and a van, there was also aD issue as to 
whether a particular witness was qualified to give expert evidence. Dixon 
CJ stated that such evidence could have been given by someone more 
highly qualified that the expert, and what had been presented in court was 
partly the evidence of opinion outside of any qualifications that the witness 
could be said to possess. IS Thus, an expert witness is expected to be just 
that, an expert, in What is known as the expertise rule. 19 For instance, in 
the litigation involving the Seven Network and News Ltd regarding the 
demise of the Seven Network's pay televisions station, C7, the reports of 
two expert witnesses were rejected by the court on the grounds that the 
witnesses were not experts in the relevant area. 20 It should also be noted 
that an expert is expected to be independently objective and impartial, with 
the degree to which the expert displays these features having an impact on 
the fact finder's evaluation ofthe probative value of the evidence?1 
As well as the requirement that the person presenting the evidence he an 
expert, a further requirement is that it must involve an area capable of 
being classified as an area of expertise. 22 Dixon CJ in Clarke v Ryan 
stated that experts could not testify in areas that were not part of a fonnal 
sphere of knowledge. 23 Freckelton and Selby24 suggest that Murphy v R 25 
supports the use of a common knowledge rule26 . Furthennore, Mason CJ 
and Toohey J have stated that the evidence must be outside the fact 
16 Ian Freckelton and Hugh Selby, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure 
and Advocacy (2005) 24. 
17 (1960) 103 CLR 486. 
18 Ibid 492. 
19 Freckelton and Selby, above n 16,24. 
20 Seven Network v News Ltd and Others No 14 [2006) FCA 500; Seven Network v 
News Ltd and Omers No 15 [2006] 515, though it should be noted that in the 
later case, parts of the expert report were accepted. 
21 Freckeltoti and Selby, above n16, 25. For case law see National Justice 
Campania SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd ('The Ikarian Reefer,) [1993] 2 
Lluyd's Rep 68, 81-82. 
22 Freckelton and Selby, above n 16, 61, 64. 
23 Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486, 49l. 
24 Freckelton and Selby, above n 16, 179. 
25 (1989) 167 CLR 94. 
26 Note however s 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Ctb), s 80 Evidence Act 1995 
(NSW) and s 80 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) which state that the evidence is 
not inadmissible only .. because it is a matter of common krlOwledge. Freckelton 
and Selby suggest that this section in these acts appears to have abolished the 
commOl) knowledge rule in those jurisdictions: see Freckelton and Selby. above 
n 16, 10l. 
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finder's experience and knowledge. 27 Dixon CJ in Clark v Ryan stated 
that the opinion of witnesses possessing peculiar skills is admissible 
whenever the subject matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons 
are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment on the subject 
matter without such assistance. 28 
More recently in Makita(Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles 29 Heydon JA 
stated that: 
[1]f evidence is tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must 
be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of "specialised knowledge" 30; 
there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness 
demonstrates by reason of specialis'ed training, study or experience, the 
witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be "wholly or 
substantially based on the witness's expert Imowledge". 
Thus, the cOUlis have indicated what is acceptable expert evidence, and 
this will be considered when examining the issue as to what evidence can 
be used to establish whether labour market controls have achieved a 
sporting league's objective of creating a more even competition. 
B Expert Evidence in Adamson 
In Adamson one of the expert witnesses was Brahm Dabscheck, an 
academic from the University of New South Wales, who gave evidence 
relating to a method he had developed that attempted to measure the 
degree of conlpetitiveness over a given period of time. This method 
involved using the average finishing places of the 12 Melbourne based 
teams that competed in the VFL from 1925 to 1972. The method consisted 
of taking a minimum number of years equal to the number of teams in the 
competition, then making the assumption that if there was strict equality in 
the competition, each team during this period would finish just once in 
each place in the competition. Hence, if the competition consisted of 12 
teams then over a 12 year period, assuming equality of players, each team 
would occupy evety position from first to twelfth. In such a result, the 
mean score of each team would be 6.5. The actual placing was taken from 
27 Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94, 111. 
28 Clark 11 Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486, 491. 
29 (2001) 52 NSWLR 705,743-44. 
30 Note that his Honour was using the wording of s79 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), 
s79 Evidence Act J 995 (NSW) and 879 Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) which state that 
an exception to opinion evidence is that which is based on specialised 
knowledge. 
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this period and a standard deviation from the mean was calculated from the 
actual results. 31 
Dabscheck's methodology, however, was strongly criticised in Adamson 
with Hill J doubting the underlying assumption that if there was equality of 
playing talent evelY team would fill once, and only once, each position in 
the ladder over a time span corresponding to the number of teams in the 
competition32 . His Honour's opinion was based on the fact that because of 
the relatively short time period of the study, the sample size was simply 
too small to produce a statistically sound result33 . Thus, there is judicial 
opinion that there are problems in using statistics to determine the 
evenness or otherwise of sports leagues as the sample size may not be 
large enough to apply such statistics. 
Justice Hill also stated that there was no objective test accepted by the 
expelis in the field upon which he could rely to measure the 
competitiveness of teams in the competition, and that there was no 
accepted method of arriving at an 'index ofcompetitiveness,.34 Hill J was 
also of the opinion that Dabscheck was not qualified to give evidence in 
relation to his method, as such evidence could only be given by a person 
qualified as an expert in statistics, with his Honour pointing out that 
Dabscheck had only studied statistics for one year as an undergraduate 
studenes His HOllour was also critical of Dabscheck and another witness, 
Professor Swan, for having such obvious support for free labour markets, 35 
and therefore potential1y lacking the impartiality required of an expert 
witness. Justice Hill then concluded that the issue of reasonableness in 
regard to the draft was to be detennined by reference to the practical 
operation of the rules of the draft, not by 'academic economic theory.'36 
A narrow interpretation of Hill J's decision would limit these fmdings in 
relation to expert witnesses to the specific facts of the case. Thus it would 
be limited to the specific statistical test that was presented to the court in 
Adamson and to the academic who gave such evidence. A broader 
interpretation, however, one favoured by the author, is that the fmdings 
underline more basic problems with the presentation of statistical data by 
economists in regard to whether a competition is an even one or not. TIlis 
is because the sample size may not be substantially larger than that which 
31 Dabscheck, 'Sporting Equality', above n 2, 184. 
32 Adamson v NSW Rugby League Ltd (1991) 27 FCR 535,563. 
33 Ibid 562-3. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, 563. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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was used in Adamson, and so therefore the question remains as to whether 
the sample size is sufficient for proper statistical analysis. It is also 
suggested that many economists are unlikely to have any more statistical 
training than the academic who gave evidence in Adamson, and this may 
well present a problem when the evidenct:; given relies almost entirely on a 
statistically obtained result. 
It is also suggested that there are other inherent problems with relying on 
statistically obtained results when looking at this question of whether a 
competition is even or not. Competitions like the VFL-AFL have· not 
remained the same over a long period of time, but have continued to 
evolve. Thus, the number of teams in this competition has changed with 
new teams being admitted, the merger of two teams to create the Brisbane 
Lions, and the demise of one team during the time when the competition 
was the VFL.37 Other factors, such as the number of finalists each year 
and how the final system has worked, have also changed reasonably 
regularly over the history of the VFL-AFL. All these factors make it harder 
to obtain a reliable result solely by the application of statistics. Utt and 
Fort,38 when applying league winning percentages (Gini coefficients) to 
measure within season competitive balance in Major League baseball, 
noted that additional complexity created by unbalanced schedules, inter-
divisional matches and inter-league play39 has to be overcome before these 
coefficients can precisely estimate competitive balance. This author 
questions whether all these variables can in fact be sufficiently overcome 
to produce a meaningful set of statistically based results. 
It is the author's opinion, therefore, that Adamsor: represents an authority 
that the application of economic theory to sports competition is 
questionable; that there are problems in using statistics when looking at the 
37 The original teams that formed the VFL in 1897 were Carlton, Collingwood, 
Essendon, Fitzroy, Geelong, Melbourne, South Melbourne and St. Kilda. In 
1908 Richmond and University were admitted, thoughVniversity do not 
compete after 1914. West Coast and the Brisbane Bears were admitted in 1987, 
Adelaide in 1991, Fremantle in 1995 and Port Adelaide in 1997. In 1997 Fitzroy 
and the Brisbane Bears merged to fonn the Brisbane Lions. 
38 Joshua Utt and Rodney Fort, 'Pitfalls to Measuring Competitive Balance with 
Gini Coefficients' (2002) 3 lournal a/Sports Economics 367. 
39 Major League Baseball is divided into two leagues, the National League and the 
American League. Legally, the two leagues are separate entities, though since 
1903 the winner of the National League has played the wilmer of the American 
League in the World Series. More recently, inter-league games have been 
incorporated into the regular season. Both leagues are divided geographically, 
with teams in those divisions playing each other on a more regular basis that 
they do other teams in the same league but in a different division of either the 
National or AmericaE League. 
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question as to whether a sporting league has created a more even 
competition; and that there is a possibility that the majority of economists 
are not going to be accepted as experts in statistics by the court because of 
their lack of high level training in statistics. It is also suggested that Hill 
J's reasoning in regard to the use of expert evidence in Adamson is 
consistent with the use of expert witnesses in Australian courts, and this 
needs to be kept in mind when examining the sports economics material 
relating to whether a sporting league has created a more even competition. 
C Sports Economics and its Use as Expert Evidence 
There have been many studies by sports economists that look at the 
question as to whether labour market controls have helped to create more 
even competitions,40 with the intention of providing suggestions for 
decision makers in the professional sport indu stry. 4 1 As well as the 
previously mentioned admissibility problems, the author has other 
reservations concerning their usefulness in relation to a study of the AFL. 
For instance, Borland and MacDonald concluded that it is the seasonal 
competitive balance that matters in regard to attendance for a number of 
different sports, there being a relation between attendance and competitive 
balance within a season and between seasons.42 Owen and Weatherston,43 
exan1ined the seasonal factors when looking at Super 12 rugby union 
attendances in New Zealand, as did Utt and Fort in regard to Major League 
baseball in the US. 44 While the author accepts that attendances arc, and 
always will be, affected by the teams' Oll-field performance during a 
particular season, this is not necessarily relevant to a study of the AFL 
which is prepared, and has the resources, to subsidise clubs that struggle 
financially during a particular season. In recent years the AFL, with money 
procured from lucrative television rights deals, has given grants of around 
$lm to Melbourne, Kangaroos and the Western Bulldogs and during the 
2006 season, a $2m package to Carlton 45. Another factor that must be 
considered is that thc purpose of the labour market controls presently 
implemented by the AFL, namely the salary cap and draft system, is to 
provide a much hnger term benefit than just one season. Any analysis, 
therefore, of whether th.e AFL achieves its legitimate objective of a more 
even competition, and thus justifies its protectable interests, must be taken 
40 Dabscheck, 'Sporting Equality', above n 2. 
41 ] effrey Borland and Robert MacDonald, 'The Demand for Sport' (2003) Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 478. 
42 Ibid 486. 
43 P.Dorian Owen and Clayton R. Weatherston, 'Unceliainty of Outcome and 
Super 12 Rugby Union Attendance' (2004) Journal of Sports Economics 347. 
44 Utt and Fort, above n 37. 
45 'Blues receive assistance', AFL Record, 21-23 July; 2006, 23. 
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with a longer term view in mind. It should also be noted that in Rugby 
Union Players Association v Commerce Commission,46 a ease involving a 
challenge to the introduction of a quota system to limit the movement of 
players in New Zealand rugby union, Smellie J stated that in looking at 
such matters, it is thc long term view that needs to be taken into 
consideration. 47 Even Borland and McDonald acknowledge that sporting 
leagues administrators may have a basis for imposing rules and regulations 
that seek to achieve competitive balance, but that these 'regulations can 
only be justified on a public benefit basis where they can be demonstrated 
to address the issues of longer tenn competitive balance. ,48 
While the author accepts the validity of such economic studies to help 
determine the best way of organising sporting leagues, it is also justifiable 
to approach the question of whether labour market controls have created a 
more even competition from a legal perspective. This is because it is a 
legal requirement that the party implementing a restraint of trade illustrate 
that the controls help to achieve its stated objective, namely a more even 
competition, with the law also determining what evidence is admissible to 
support this claim. 
o The Use of Comparative Figures 
The author's approach in regard to looking at whether a particular sporting 
league has created a more even competition is to present, not an analysis 
that provides a test of statistical significance as to whether the VFL-AFL 
competition is even or not, but a comparison of figures from which others, 
including judges, can decide for themselves whether or not the figures 
indicate that an even competition has been created. While this use of 
comparative figures may be considered to be a basic statistical measure of 
the deviation between two data, it does, however, fall short of producing a 
result based on an objective, statistical test that an expert witness would 
then be stating should be accepted by the court. 
How this comparison of figures can be used can be illustrated by looking 
at the example of the use of batting averages, aggregates and other figures 
(such as the number of centuries scored) to decide who is the best batsman 
in the history of Test cricket. Although the comparison of these figures is 
only subjective, the outstanding figures of Sir Donald Bradman mean that 
the vast majority of cricket connnentators and supporters consider him the 
best batsman of all time. The author would also add that these comparative 
46 [1997] 3 NZLR 30 l. 
47 Ibid 327. 
4S Borland and MacDonald, above n 41, 498. 
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figures, or 'sports statistics', are used constantly in sport, and it is only 
sports economists who have applied statistical significance to them. 
Therefore, the author's method in this paper is based on figures that 
various sports use, and involve the two factors most people would use for 
measuring success in a sporting competition, namely, how many 
premierships various teams have won, and how often a team has made the 
finals. 
Finally, it should also be noted that in Smith v Pro Football Inc,49 a case 
challenging the National Football League's (NFL) draft system, both the 
majority and minority judges used comparative style figures in regard to 
how many times teams had made the playotfs over a period of years. 
These were used to help support their respective views as to the validity of 
the draft system. 
Thus, this use of comparative figures can provide evidence to support the 
evenness or unevenness of a competition that may be more acceptable to 
the courts than a statistical significance approach. 
III HOW EVEN IS THE AFL COMPETITION 
A Oabscheck's Study 
As previously mentioned, Dabscheck developed a method to attempt to 
measure the degree of competitiveness over a given time. Using such 
methodology for the period of 1925 to 1972, Dabscheckso concluded that 
the 12 team, Melbourne based competition during this period was an 
unequal one, indicating that the labour controls used during this period had 
not given rise to competition equality, a view also expressed by Crockett J 
in Foschini. Hill J, however, doubted the underlying assumption of this 
method that in an even competition each team would fill once, and only 
once, each position in the ladder over a time span corresponding to the 
number of teams in the competition. Anothcr suggested flaw in the 
methodology is that it measures absolute or total equality, as this requires, 
amongst other things, a continuous rotation of the teams in regard to which 
team wins the premiership each year. It is suggested this is impossible for 
even in a totally even competition brought about by labour market 
controls, other factors such as injuries, poor umpiring decisions and bad 
weather, may affect matches, and therefore which team actually wins the 
premiership. His fmiher suggested that such a totally even competition 
would also be as predictable as an AFL competition where only a few 
49 593 F 2d 1173, 1184, 1202 (1978). 
50 Dabscheck, 'Sp0l1ing Equality', above n 2, 184-5. 
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teams are likely to win in every decade. Therefore, what the AFL is trying 
to achieve in its competition is reasonable equality, with this being defined 
as one which produces figures that are in between what an uneven 
competition would produce, and what a totally even competition would 
produce. Thus, in relation to how many teams in a given decade win the 
competition, a totally even competition would have ten different teams 
winning the premiership, while an uneven competition would have aromld 
three to four teams winning the competition. Therefore, a reasonably even 
competition would be one having six to seven different teams winning the 
premiership in a given decade. 
It is suggested, therefore, that it is reasonable equality that should be the 
objective of a sporting league, as not only is it a far more realistic 
objective, but it is also what a sporting league that implements labour 
market controls is actually trying to achieve. 
B MacDonald's Study 
Another study that examined the question as to whether , .• ..; AFL 
competition is an even one was that made by MacDonald 51 who looked at 
three different hypothesis in relation to the AFL' s labour market controls, 
namely: (1) that seasonal, and long term, winning percentages of each club 
in the AFL competition had not declined in the post draft era; (2) the 
average winning margin in AFL matches had not declined in the post draft 
period; (3) there was no decline in the long tern1. dominance of the AFL 
competition by certain clubs in the post-draft period. MacDonald's52 
conclusion was that the data in relation to all three hypotheses did not 
support the AFL's assertion that the draft system, in conjunction with the 
salary cap, had made the competition more even. While the first two 
criteria are both plausible measures of the success of the relevant labour 
market controls, the author does have a few reservations. Averaging out 
winning percentages, in the author's opinion, does not necessarily indicate 
how competitive a team has been over a length of time, as a few bad 
seasons in the nine used in the figures can hide the fact that for the rest of 
the seasons the team was highly competitive, if not for the premiership, 
then at least for a finals berth. It should also be noted that a few bad 
seasons in nine will not have a detrimental effect on a club's long term, 
financial viability. It is continually finishing at, or near, the bottom of the 
table, that will place clubs under significant financial strain. 
5J Robert MacDonald, A Study a/the AFL 's Labour Market Control Mechanisms 
(Honours Thesis, Melbourne University, 1996). 
51 Ibid 60. 
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It is suggested that looking at the average winning margins is even less 
reliable, for although one of the aims of labour market controls is to create 
more matches with a close result, the reality is that factors such as injuries, 
temporary loss of fonn, or the effect of one team playing a 'blinder', 
means that there will always be big witming margins in a season, no matter 
how even the competition is. Also the actual winning margin does not 
always reflect how close the game actually was, particularly in one as high 
sC0ring as AFL. The average margin in MacDonald's study was 37 points 
before the draft, and 38 after its introduction. Such a winning margin will 
often reflecr a game comfortably won by one side. However, it can just as 
easily reflect a game that was close for four quarters, with one team 
enjoying a small lead before kicking the final four goals or so to create a 
comfOliable, but late, winning margin. Conversely, a close 16 point margin 
may reflect the opposite, where one team led comfortably all game and the 
opposition kicked the final few goals to make the score look respectable. 
MacDonald also points out that the strong pre-draft and salary cap clubs 
like Essendon, Hawthorn and Carlton remained strong after the 
introduction of the draft and salary cap, while conversely, Fitzroy, South 
MeJbourne (Sydney) and St. Kilda, remained weak before and after the 
introduction of the salary cap and draft system. He does acknowledge, 
however, that this may be partly due to the advantages or disadvantages 
the clubs acquired before the introduction of the draft. 53 
MacDonald was writing in 1996, and having the advantage of writing in 
2006, the author would point out that in the years since McDonald's study 
Sydney and St. Kilda have both made AFL Grand Finals, Sydney in 1996 
and 2005-6, St. Kilda in 1997. Sydney's appearance in the 1996 Grand 
Final was its first since 1945, while its premiership in 2005 was its first 
since 1933. Fitzroy, admittedly as a merged entity with Brisbane, won the 
2001 premiership, its first since 1944, followed by two further 
premierships in 2002 and 2003. Adelaide, an expansion club, and North 
Melbourne (Kangaroos) have each won two premierships since 1996 while 
the three strong clubs mentioned by MacDonald have won just the one 
between them, Essendon having been successful in 2000. Hawthorn failed 
to make the finals for the four years between 1997-2000, including 
finishing second last (15th) in 1999, and missed out on the finals in 2002-6, 
again finishing 15th in 2004. Carlton meanwhile finished last in 2002, 
second last in 2003, and last in 2005 and 2006. Essendon and Hawthorn 
also finished in the bottom four in 2005, with Essendon then finishing 
second last in 2006. Thus, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the 
53 Ibid. 
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AFL, in the last decade or so, has seen a definite decline in the dominance 
by a few strong clubs. 
C The Author's AnalysIs 
The author's analysis on the evenness of the VFL-AFL competition 
involves firstly breaking the history of the VFL-AFL into ten 'decades': 
1897 to 1906, 1907 to 1919 (excluding the years 1916-18 when not all the 
clubs participated because of World War I), then 1920-29, 1930- 39 etc up 
until 1990-99. Decades were considered to be the most appropliate length 
of time for this study because it is the long term perspective that needs to 
be examined when looking at whether a competition is an even one or not, 
particularly with the AFL which, as has been previously mentioned, is 
willing and able to subsidise short tenn losses. 
The reason for using numerical decades was for both simplicity, and also 
because it fits in with how the sport itselflooks at its history. The AFL, for 
instance, designated round 16 of the 2006 season as a Heritage Round, 
with the theme being the 1980's which was defined as being from 1980-
89.54 It is accepted that there is an argument that the various decades could 
have started at times that better reflected the introdMction of the various 
labour market controls. However, these started at various years, the 
country zone was implemented in 1968, the salary cap in 1984 and the 
national draft in 1986. Therefore, there was no obvious year in which to 
begin the decades based on the introduction of the labour market controls. 
It should also be remembered that the introduction of a particular labour 
market control is unlikely to have an immediate, measurable effect on the 
competition, particularly zone systems and draft systems, as most of the 
players selected will be youngsters who will take a while to have an impact 
on the team's strength. It is suggested, therefore, that a more appropriate 
date to start examining whether the country zone, or the national draft, had 
an impact on the evenness of the competition will be 1 Q70 and 1990 
respectively. 
To ascertain how equal the competition was per decade, three criteria were 
then used: 
1. The number of different teams winning premierships in a 
particular decade. 
2. The periods of n011- final appearances in the decade, that 
is, how many teams went the full decade without ever 
making the finals. 
;4 See Cameron Sinclair, 'The Decade in History', AFL Record, 21-23 July 2006, 
35, 
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3. How many teams made their 'finals quota,55 in a given 
decade. If eight teams in a 16 team competition for 
instance make the finals each year, that is 50 per cent, 
then each club should make the finals five times in a 
decade in an even competition as this represents 50 per 
cent of the time. While it is appropriate to look at whether 
clubs have fulfilled their full quotas it is suggested that 
reasonable, rather than absolute, equality is what the 
legitimate objective should be. It is therefore suggested 
that looking at whether clubs have attained 60 per cent of 
their finals quota in a given decade, is a more appropriate 
method of looking at the equality of the competition, as 
this is a measure of reasonable, rather than total equality. 
Whilst looking at the number of teams winning premierships is a good 
stmiing point, premierships are not necessarily the best or only measure of 
success. This is why the make up of the finals was also included as this 
provides a better and broader picture. It is also suggested that in the 
modem era of full time professionalism in the AFL it is essential that all 
clubs remain competitive for the fmals over a reasonable period of time. 
Long term periods of non-finals appearances, like Hawthorn's 32 years 
from 1925 to 1956 are no longer sustainable if a team is to survive in the 
professional era. This is why extcnded pcriods of non-final appearances, as 
well as actual final appearances, need to be examined when looking at the 
evenness of the competition. 
1 Teams Winning the Premierships 
Table 1 summarises the data relating to the number of teams winning the 
premiership in each decade. The first figure represents the number of 
different teams which won a premiership during that decade, the second 
the number of teams in the competition in that decade. 
55 A quota in this context is defined as a stipulated number: see The Australian 
Oxford Dictiol1G1J1 (Second Edition, 1998). 
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1900's 5/8 
1910's 5/9 
1920's 6/12 6/9 * 
1930's 6/12 






The data shows that the highest number is seven different premiership 
winners, the lowest, four. What the results also indicate is that there was a 
decline from the 1930's in the number of different teams winning the 
premiership, with the 1960's being the only exception to that trend until 
the 1990's. Based on the number of premierships won, the competition 
appears to be the least even during the 1970's and the 1980's, and in fact 
when these two decades are combined, just five teams WOll the premiership 
during that twenty year period. Thus, the figures from Table 1 suggest that 
the introduction of the country zoning system in 1968 had absolutely no 
impact on creating a more equal competition than what had previously 
existed. By comparison the 1990's, when the full impact of the salary cap-
draft system was stm.iing to be felt, not only was this trend towards a fewer 
number of different premiers in a decade reversed,but that decade has the 
equal highest number of premiership winners. It is also suggested that the 
greater number of teams in the competition since the mid 1990's has no 
bearing on this conclusion. If the presence of sixteen teams somehow 
makes it easier for more teams to win the premiership in a given decade, it 
does not explain why Brisbane were able to win three in a row between 
2001-3, only the third time it has happened in the history of the VFL-AFL. 
This success, however, was built on the outstanding talent of promising 
young players, rather than the buying of players from other clubs that bad 
. been the basis of, for instance, Carlton's success in the 1970's and 1980's. 
Despite Brisbane's three wins, it should be noted that the present 2000 
decade has had five different premiers in its first seven years. 
56 Note that the figures in brackets in Table 1 and in the following tables, indicate 
what may be considered to be the more accurate description of the number of 
teams in the competition for that decade, given the fact that new teams entered 
the competition at some time during that decade. Therefore the first figures 
given are the actual figures, while those given in brackets are what might be 
considered to be the best representation for that decade. 
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2 Number of Teams Making the Finals in a Given Decade 
It is suggested that the aim of a competition that strives to be an equal one 
is to have teams, if not winning the premiership, to at least not go for long 
spells without making the finals. This is because in the modem 
professional era it is essential that teams remain competitive for the finals 
as even fmancially well off clubs are likely to be placed under financial 
pressure if they suffer long periods without making the finals. The 
suggested minimum requirement in regard to this criterion is to have all 
teams make the finals at least once in each decade. Table 2 presents the 
figures in relation to how many teams made the finals at least once in the 
decade though it should be noted that only teams that were in the 
competition for the whole of that particular decade were counted. The 
underlying problem with this analysis is that the number of teams that have 
made the finals each year has varied over the history of the VFL/ AFL. 
What amounted to a final four in an eight team competition operated from 
1897 to 1907, a final four in a ten team was in force from 1908 to 1914, 
and a final four in a nine team competition operated until 1924. It 
subsequently became a final four in a 12 team competition until 1971 
when a final five was introduced. Even when the competition was 
expanded to 14 teams in 1987, a final five was still used, though this was 
expanded to a final six in 1991. A final eight was introduced in 1994, 
firstly for a 15 team competition, then for the present 16 team competition 
in place since 1995. However, while the number of teams in the 
competition and the number making the finals has changed over time, it is 
worth noting that the number of teams not making the finals since 1925 
has been remarkably consistent at eight. The only exception to this has 
been the period from 1973 to 1986 when seven missed the finals and 1987 
to 1993 when nine missed the finals. Percentage wise the number of teams 
n1.aking the finals is now 50 per cent. Therefore, in order to make a more 
meaningful comparison with the present situation in regard to the AFL 
finals set up, a set of modified results have been made by looking at what 
the results would be if the finals representation was a consistent 50 per 
cent over the whole period of the VFL/AFL. An example as to how these 
modified results were calculated is the 1930's when a final four operated 
in a 12 team competition. To make this comparable, percentage wise, with 
the present day format of eight teams making the finals in 16 team 
competition, the results were modified for the 1930's so that the top six 
teams, that is 50 per cent, were considered to have made the finals each 
year. In 1933, for instance, Fitzroy and Collingwood finished fifth and 
sixth respectively and therefore did not make the finals, but were 
considered to have done so under the modified results. 
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Only three times, in the decades 1907-1919, 1920-29 and 1990-99 did all 
the 'full time' teams make the ilnals at least once during that decade, 
though after modifying the results the 1970' s also fulfilled this criteria. It 
should be acknowledged, however, that in each of those decades there 
were teams who played for a few seasons without making the finals. 
University, for instance, played until 1914 without making the finals 
before pennanently withdrawing from the competition. North Melbourne 
(now Kangaroos), Footscray (now Western Bulldogs) and Hawthorn all 
joined the then VFL in 1925 without any of them making the finals in that 
decade, while Fremantle joined the AFL in 1995 and only made the finals 
for the first time in 2003. It is also interesting to note that the two decades 
that perfonned the worse in terms of the number of teams wilming the 
premierships, namely the 1970's and 1980's, did much better on this 
criterion as in both decades 11 out of the 1 2 full time teams made the finals 
at least once, and with the modification of the results, the 1970's would 
have had all 12 teams making the finals at least once. The 1960's 
meanwhile had two teams in that decade that never made the finals even 
after the results were modified. Therefore, despite the fact that seven 
different teams won the premiership, the 1960's can still be considered as a 
decade where the competition was uneven. Compare that with the 1990's 
which also produced seven different premiership winners, yet at the same 
time also managed to have all the full time clubs make the finals at least 
once in that decade. 
Overall, in regard to this criterion, it should be noted that even after 
modifying the results, the 1990' s is still one of only four decades that have, 
or would have had, all full time teams making the finals at least once 
during that decade. Since the 1920's the only other time this happened was 
with the modified results of the 1970's. It should also be noted that all 
teams had made the finals at least once in the 2000 decade after just five 
years of this decade. 
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(a) Teams Not Making the Finals: Other Figures 
Linked to this factor of how frequently teams make the finals are two other 
interesting sets of figures, namely the longest periods without making the 
finals, and secondly, the teams who have made dramatic rises from the 
bottom of the ladder one year to the finals the fonowing year. This, it is 
suggested, can only be presented as examples, rather than as figures that 
can be directly compared between the various decades. The record for the 
longest periods without making the finals is held by Hawthorn at 32 years 
from 1925-1956. The next longest periods are South Melbourne (now 
Sydney) with 24 years from 1946-69, and Melbourne 22 years fi.·om 1965-
86. Even 'modifying' these results does not greatly alter the situation. 
Hawthorn's record for instance would only be altered by a 5th place in 
1943, and hence would still have a period of 18 years without making the 
finals, one year in the finals, followed by another period of 13 years 
without, and South Melbourne a 17 year one without making the finals. It 
is suggested that one of the real tests of the effectiveness of the AFL's 
draft system, and its accompanying salary cap, will be to see a dramatic 
reduction in the incidence of these long spells without making the finals, 
though this can' only be effectively analysed in the coming decades. 
As far as teams reaching the finals the year after finishing at, or near, the 
bottom of the league ladder, the best example is Collingwood which went 
from last in 1976 to first place in 1977, and a subsequent place in the 
Grand Final. A look at the VFL-AFL records, however, indicates that such 
a move is not very common, usually occurring no more than once a 
decade. In the 1960's, for instance, the best result based on this criterion 
was Collingwood's seventh in 1968 to first on the league ladder in 1969. 
Thf. usual situation is the gradual improvement which Melbourne, for 
instance, experienced in the 1930's when it went from tenth in 1933 to 
sixth in 1934 and 1935, before finally securing a finals berth by finishing 
fourth in 1936. 
The 1990's, however, show a different story in regard to this criterion as 
four teams have gone from near bottom fInishes one year to finals berths 
the next. Two of these teams, Melbourne in 1997-98, and Blisbane in 
1998-99, went from last place one year to a place in the Preliminary Final, 
that is, the final four, the following year. Sydney meanwhile finished last 
between 1992 and 1994, yet was able to make the 1996 Grand Final. 
During the present 2000 decade it should be noted that Collingwood has 
gone from being a Grand Finalist in 2002 and 2003 to finishing 13th and 
15th in 2004 and 2005, before returning to the top eight in 2006. This 
suggests that the combination of the salary cap, draft system and smaller 
playing lists now in operation in the AFL makes it easier for teams at the 
bottom of the competition in one particular year to quickly make their way 
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up the ladder the following year. The explanation for this would be that 
there is now less of a gap between the top teams and the bottom teams 
each season, making such moves much easier than they were in the past, 
though in some instances teams may have been helped by priority 
selections in the national draft. It is suggested that the examples given here 
further support the proposition that the AFL IS now a more even 
competition than it has been since the 1920's. 
3 Finals Quota 
While examining how many of the teams made the finals at least once in 
each decade presents a broader picture than merely examining the number 
of teams which won premierships, it can also be a somewhat misleading. 
This is because this figure can be distorted by a number of teams making 
the finals just once, maybe twice, in a decade otherwise heavily dominated 
by a relatively few number of strong teams. The 1970's and 1980's are 
good exan1ples of this. Therefore, the third criterion that was examined 
was that of a finals quota, that is, how many times each team should have 
made the finals in each decade, given a totally even competition. 
In working out figures such as the finals quota it is suggested that Justice 
Hill's criticism of Dabscheck's method of measuring competition equality 
should be further examined. His Honour stated that Dabscheck's 
assumption was that if equality existed each team would fill once, and only 
once, each position on the ladder during the time in question. His Honour 
suggested that such an assumption would be correct over a long period of 
time, but raised doubts as to its accuracy over the relatively short time in 
which it was implemented. As Hill J pointed out a six sided dice would, 
over a long period of time, eventually fall an even number of times on each 
number. Over a short period of time variations, however, will occur.57 
Using Hill J's dice analogy for the finals quota what essentially is being 
done is to divide the dice numbers into two groups: one group representing 
the teams making the finals, the other for the teams that did not. When just 
four teams made the finals out of 12, that is, when the finals quota was 33 
per cent, numbers one to four would represent not making the finals, 
numbers five and six would represent making the finals. When the finals 
quota is 50 per cent, as it presently is, then nU1nbers one to three would 
represent not making the finals, nillTlbers four to six would represent teams 
making the finals. In the latter case if the competition was indeed equal, 
then the dice would fall half the time on the bottom three numbers, half the 
time 011 the top three numbers. It is suggested that even over the relatively 
short time in which the VFL-AFL has existed, this would be statistically 
57 Adamson v Nev.>, South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1991) 27 FCR 535, 563. 
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easier to obtain than expecting each number to fall an equal number of 
times, as required by the Dabscheck method. 
It should also be noted that in using this criterion the total equality that 
Dabscheck discusses would be represented by every team fulfilling their 
finals quota each decade. As previously mentioned total equality is 
unattainable as even in a perfectly equal competition brought about by 
labour market controls, other variables for which sport is well known will 
affect the results, and potentially the make up of the finals. 58 This is ()ne of 
the reasons why reasonable equality, rather than absolute or total equality, 
should be the aim of a sporting organisation. Therefore, rather than 
requiring all the teams to make their quota in order for the competition to 
be considered equal, a result supporting the claim of an even competition 
would occur if the overwhelming majority of teams achieve around 60 per 
cent, that is around two thirds of their finals quota. The reason for using 
this 60 per cent is that with the present AFL finals system the quota is 50 
per cent, meaning that five finals appearances are required to achieve the 
full finals quota. This 60 per cent fonnat then requires teams to make the 
finals at least three times in that decade. Therefore, a 60 per cent formula 
rather than a 66 percent one, allows full numbers rather than fractions to be 
used. 
(a) Full Finals Quota 
As previously mentioned the AFL's full finals quota is currently 50 per 
cent, that is, each side in a totally even competition would make the finals 
five years out of ten as eight of the 16 teams make the finals each year. 
The full finals quota was also 50 per cent between 1897 and 1907 when 
four teams out of eight made the finals. When four teams out of 12 made 
the final each year, as occurred between 1925 and 1973, the quota was 
only 33 per cent, that is, each team should have made the finals three times 
in that decade. In other periods the quota was somewhere in between the 
two, as either four out of nine or ten teams made the final (1908 to 1924), 
58 The AFL presently has a 16 team competition for which there are 22 rounds 
before the finals series. This means that every season each team plays each other 
once, and then 'lUother seven teams, twice. The teams that play each other twice 
vary ft.-om season to season on a rotating system. While this system may make it 
appear that some clubs will have a slightly easier draw in a particular season, 
this evens out over a longer period, like the ten years that are used here. The 
author therefore argues that this present system has no impact on the figures 
used here, unlike the system used by the major team sports in the United States 
where the teams are divided into permanent, geographically determined 
divisions, conferences or leaglles, the relative strength of which can determine a 
team's success over a given period oftime. 
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five out of 12 (1974-86), or six out of 14 or 15 (1987-1992). One of the 
main advantages, therefore, of using a finals quota is that is does not 
matter that the decades had a differing number of teams making the finals 
each year, therefore the results do not have to be modified. Table 4 
provides the data on the full finals quota criterion. Note that in the results 
column, the number of teams reaching their finals quota in that particular 
decade is listed first, the number not making that quota is given second. 
The higher the first number, therefore, in comparison to the second, the 
more equal the competition was in that particular decade. The percentages 
represent the number of teams reaching their quota in that decade as 
against the number of teams which did not. For teams which were not part 
of the competition for the whole of a particular decade, the ratio has been 
calculated on the number of years that they were actually in the 
competition. Fremantle, for example, was only in the competition for five 
years of the 1990's decade. As the ratio for that decade was 50 per cent, 
Fremantle would have exceeded its ratio if it had made the finals three 
times durillg the 1990's. 
With the full finals quota method half the decades had an even split: the 
1900's, 1930's, 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, that is, in each of those 
decades half the teams fulfilled their quota, half did not. Three decades, the 
1920's, 1940's and 1950's, had positive splits in that more teams made 
their finals quota than did not, which meant, based on this criterion, these 
were the decades with the most even competition. Only two decades, the 
19] 0' s and the 1990' s, had a negative split, that is, less teams made the 
quota than did not, an indication of an uneven competition. In relation to 
the 1910's it should be noted that two teams were only just under their 
quota in that they ma.'1aged to make the finals three times rather than the 
required four. The 1990's showed a similar pattem with four teams being 
just under their finals quota. It should also be noted that it was a decade in 
which the number of teams in the competition and the number of teams 
making tl}e finals changed several times as the VFL expanded into the 
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national AFL. This made the finals quota an awkward 4.75, and perhaps 
makes the figures look worse than they actually were. In fact, if the quota 
is simply taken as four, rather than being rounded up to five as was done, 
then the figures actually go from being the worse to being easily the best 
as 68 per cent of the teams would then have made their quota. 
(b) Sixty Per Cent of Finals Quota 
As was previously mentioned, a better way of presenting the material in 
relation to the finals quota is to look at how many teams in a given decade 
achieved 60 per cent of their finals quota. The data is presented in Table 4, 
and as with Table 3, the number of teams achievil'lg this 60 per cent of 
finals quota is given first, the number not, being given second. 
Table 4: Per Cent of Finals 
It is suggested that the main aspect of these results are that they confirm 
that the 1990's was an even decade and that the relatively poor result in 
Table 3 was simply reflects the complicated quota system that developed 
in that decade due to the changing number of teams and numbers making 
the finals. The other results confirm what other criteria suggested, namely 
that for most decades the VFL/ AFL has been an uneven competition as 
apart from the 1990's, no decade had more than 75 per cent of teams 
achieve 60 per cent of their finals quota. 
IV SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The then VFL competition started out as an uneven competition, probably 
due to a combination of population demographics, potential playing 
strength, and the readiness of clubs to having a competitive team in 1897. 
Over the next two decades, there appears to be an evening out, cuhninating 
in an even competition in the 1920's. This indicates the metropolitan 
zoning was initially successful in providing a mea11S of creating ali even 
competition. 
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The 1930's saw a return to a more uneven competition, perhaps due to the 
introduction of three new teams in 1925 which then struggled to be 
competitive throughout the 1930's. However, around this time clubs 
started to look well beyond their metropolitan zones for players, with some 
clubs being more successful in obtaining these players than others. This 
trend continued into the 1940' s where the Second World War does not 
seem to have had much effect on the evenness/unevenness of the 
competition. 
The 1950's saw the continuation of a c:¢mpetition almost as uneven as it 
had been at the very beginning of theVFL, and such a trend continued 
almost unchanged until the 1980s. In fact in the 60 year period from the 
1930's to the 1980's, the VFL might be described as being 'equally 
unequal'. What this indicates is that the various labour controls 
implemented during this time, com1try zoning, the interstate draft, the 
maximum wage restraint, transfer fees and clearance rules had absolutely 
no effect in creating equality within the VFL. This agrees with 
Dabscheck's59 conclusion in relation to his empirical data for the period 
1925-73. A1l the com1try zoning seemed to have achieved was to help a 
few strong teams retain their inherent advantage and to create a new strong 
team in Hawthorn. Hawthorn in fact went from wim1ing just one 
premiership prior to the introduction of the country zoning to wilming the 
most premierships (eight) between 1971 and 1991, the period when the 
country zoning would have had the most influence on the results of the 
competition. The author would also suggest that without the labour market 
controls introduced by the VFL-AFL in the 1980's there was a real danger 
that only three teams would have had a realistic chance of regularly 
winning the competition: the two richest at that time, Essendon and 
Carlton, and as mentioned, the one with seemingly the best country zone, 
Hawthorn. 
The 1990's saw a reversal in the trend, with a return to the most even 
competition since the 1920's, as indicated by it having the equal highest 
number of different teams winning the premiership, and the fact that all the 
full time teams made the finals at least once. This also meant that no team 
was in the midst of a 20-30 year period without making the finals, 
something that had occurred in every decade since the 1920's. It was also 
the only decade where two teams went from last place to a high finals 
place the following year. While the changing structure of the competition 
during the 1990's lTlay have resu1ted in the poor result for the full finals 
quota criterion, rather than m1evenness in the competition during that 
59 Dabscheck. 'SportingEquaiity'. aboven2, 184-7. 
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decade, it should be noted that the figures from the 60 per cent of final 
quota calculations support the view of the 1990' s being an even 
competition. Therefore, whether it was the salary cap, draft system, or 
most likely a combination of the two, there was a markedly more even 
competition in the 1990's. It can therefore be concluded that the labour 
market controls brought in by the VFL-AFL since 1984 have had a 
significant effect in creating an even competition. It is further suggested 
that if the AFL is indeed an even competition it will continue to show the 
following trends over the coming decades: (1) around six different teams 
winning the premiership in each decade; (2) all teams making the finals at 
least once in every decade; (3) the vast majority of the sixteen teams, ifnot 
actually achieving their full finals quota in a given decade, then at least 
achieving 60 per cent of it. 
After seven seasons in the prescnt 2000's decade, it should be noted that 
five teams have won the AFL premiership and all 16 teams have made at 
least one finals appearance. It is suggested that the figures so far for this 
decade support the view that the AFL's present labour market controls 
continue to maintain an even competition. 
V CONCLUSION 
In regard to the implementation of labour market controls, like the salary 
cap and draft systems, it is accepted that a legitimate aim of a sporting 
league is to attempt to have an even competition. Measuring this is 
difficult, as highlighted in the Adamson case involving a challenge to the 
New South Wales Rugby League (NSWRL)'s draft system where statistics 
could not be used to measure the evenness of a competition as the sample 
size examined was considered too small. This is why this paper has 
explored the use of the simpler comparison of figures, with the author fully 
acknowledging that such figures require a subjective interpretation, rather 
than amounting to objectively reached statistics. However, it is suggested 
that, based on the judicial reasoning in Adamson, it may only be these 
types of figures that can be presented as evidence to support a claim that a 
competition is an even one. The Adamson case also clearly indicates that 
the general principles of expert evidence apply to the presentation of 
material relating to whether labour market controls have created a more 
even competition. 
This comparison of figures should involve a consideration of the two 
factors that 1110st people involved in team sports would acknowledge as 
represcnting the best indications of on-field success, namely the number of 
premierships a team has won, and how often it has made the fIl1als. It is 
suggested that splitting a competition into decades, then exam-ining the 
number of teams that have won a premiership in a given decade, and then 
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comparing these figures, is an easy way to n1.easure the evenness of a 
competition. Measuring the evenness of a competition by examining how 
often teams make the finals, although a little more difficult, can be judged 
by examining how many teams reach their finals quota, or at least 60 per 
cent of that quota, in a particular decade, and the periods of non-finals 
appearances experienced by the teams. 
The author believes that the criteria presented in this paper indicate that 
while the labour market controls introduced by the VFL prior to 1984, 
except for the metropolitan zoning during the 1920's, did not create an 
even competition, the labour market controls used since 1984, namely the 
salary cap and draft system, have fulfilled their stated objective of creating 
an even competition. It is also suggested that this is supported up by 
anecdotal evidence from those within the AFL. 60 
The use of a salary cap and draft system makes the AFL one of the most 
regulated sporting leagues in the world, and in the context of industrial 
relations, its players are unquestionably subjected to restrictive 
employment conditions. Arguably the labour market controls presently 
used by the AFL have helped to create a competition financially stable 
enough to ensure the survival of all 16 teams. This is largely due to 
lucrative television deals the AFL is able to negotiate, based on the fact 
that it can provide eight games a week, with the present deal providing the 
AFL with $780m over a five year period. This in turn has provided the 
AFL with the means to support clubs in financial difficulty, most notably 
the Western Bulldogs, Melbourne, the Kangaroos, and more recently 
Carlton, thus ensuring that the players enjoy professional salaries and have 
the security that these salaries will be paid. The National Rugby League 
(NRL) by comparison, was in the recent past, less regulated as in the wake 
of the Super League war during the mid 1990's the salary cap was not 
enforced. It should also be noted that during this time when rugby league 
did not implement a salary cap both the Auckland Wan-iors and the 
Northern Eagles folded, with some players not being paid what was owed 
to them under the terms of their playing contracts. 
It is suggested therefore that the figures presented here support a claim that 
since the 1990's the AFL has attained its objective of an even competition 
by the implementation of a salary cap and draft system. In relation to this 
achievement it is also suggested that while the draft system is important in 
initially creating a reasonably even spread of the playing talent, it is the 
60 Chip Le Grand, 'Interstate clubs hold all the vital aces, The Australian 
(Sydney), 5 .Tune 2003, 16; Jessica Hallaron, 'Hayes enjoying club culture 
shock,' The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 11 July 2003, 38. 
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salary cap that is clUcial in helping to ensure that this evenness is 
maintained. It is further suggested that these criteria could also be used to 
determine the evenness of other sporting leagues. 
